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SAS 99 and Fraud Detection
Shunlan Lu
Advisor: Dr. Del DeVries

Abstract
Fraud has been a big problem in many companies in recent years. It causes both
economic and social consequences in our society. The integrity of the accounting
profession has also been questioned. In order to give better guidance for external
auditors to uncover fraud in a Umely manner and restore public confidence to the
accounting profession. the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA issued
Statement of Auditing Standards No.99 (SAS 99).

This paper discusses the

procedures required to implement SAS 99 and documents four recent fraud cases,
with a focus on how SAS 99 could have been effective to help auditors discover
these frauds.

1. Introduction ami Background

While fraud is something that can not be completely eliminated. steps can be taken in order to
detect it in a timely manner before it causes serious consequences. In order to guide external
auditors to conduct financial statement audits. The Auditing Standards Board. which is part of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. issued Statement of Auditing Standards
No. 99 effective on December 15, 2002. Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99 is a collection
of standards that supersede Statement of Auditing Standards No . 82 . Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit. SAS No. 99 corrected some of the shortcomings of SAS No . 82. so

understanding the difference between SAS 99 and SAS No. 82 could help auditors to better
follow the guidelines of SAS NO.99 and conduct the financial statement audits more efficiently.
A detailed comparison of SAS 82 and SAS 99 1 is listed in Appendix A of this paper.

1 Donald C. Marczewski and Michael D Akers ... CPA 's Perceptions of the Impact of SAS 99. " The CPA lournal
Online. lune. (2005) . 18, Nov . 2005 < http /lwww .nysscpa.org/cpajournaU200S/60S/essentials/p38.htm>

While SAS 99 is a collection of standards that is intended to help external auditors detect fraud,
becoming familiar with SAS 99 could also help management or employees prevent fraud from
happening in the first place. It would be meaningful to document several recent corporate frauds
and to test how or if SAS 99 could have been effective in detecting these frauds , so that auditors
can learn what could have been done in the past in order to detect fraud, and what should be done
in the future to conduct audits effectively.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. [n Section 2, the procedures required
to implement SAS 99 are discussed in detail. Section 3 contains four fraud case analyses,
including Enron, Tyco, World Com, and ZZZZ Best Company, for the purpose of testing how or
if SAS 99 could have been effective in detecting these frauds . [n Section 4, a conclusion is drawn
based on the four case analyses.
2. Procedures Required to Implement SAS 99

This section discusses procedures which are required to implement SAS 99. Many of these
procedures can be performed either at the same time or in a different sequence, depending on the
circumstances. SAS 99 includes the following ten procedures, and each of them will be discussed
in detail :
1. Description and characteristics of fraud
2. Professional skepticism
3. Discussion among key engagement personal
4. Information gathering
5. Risk Identification.
6. Risk Assessment
7. Responses to the results of the assessment.
8. Evaluation of audit evidence
9. Communication of possible fraud
10. Documentation of the auditor's consideration of fraud .
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Step one. Description and characteristics of fraud.

Auditors should consider two types of misstatements. The first one is misstatements arising from
fraudulent financial reporting, which may be accomplished by manipulation, falsification, or
alteration of accounting records ; by misrepresentation or intentional omission significant
information and by intentional misapplication of accounting principles. The second type of
misstatement auditors should consider is misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets,
which causes the financial statements not to be presented according to Generally Accepted
Accounting Standards.
Step two . Professional skepticism.

Due professional care requires auditors to exercise professional skepticism. When conducting a
financial statement audit, auditors should have a qu estioning mind and be critical in assessing
audit evidence . Examples of the application of professional skepticism in response to the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud are designing additional or different auditing procedures to
obtain more reliable evidence in support of specified financial statement account balances,
classes of transactions, and related assertions , and obtaining additional corroboration of
management's explanations or representations concerning material matters. Appendix 1 shows
that, compared to SAS 82, there is a dramatically increased emphasis on maintaining an attitude
of professional skepticism in SAS 99.

Step three . Discussion among key engagement personal.

Discussion among key engagement personal regarding the risks of material misstatement is
important and should continue throughout the audil. The discussion should include an exchange
of ideas among the audit team members about the susceptibility of the entity's financial
statements to material misstatement due to fraud . The discussion should emphasize the need to
maintain a questioning mind and to exercise professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating
audit evidence .
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Step four: Information gathering.

Auditors should gather the information needed to identify the risk of material misstatement due
to fraud . The first step is making inquiries of management and others within the entity about the

risks of fraud. The inquiries of management should include whether they have knowledge of any
fraud, their understanding about the risks of fraud in the entity, the programs and controls the
entity has, whether management has reported to the audit committee and so on. Besides
management, auditors should also make inquiries of the audit committee, the internal audit
personnel, and employees with varying levels of authority within the entity. The second step of
information gathering is considering the results of the analytical procedures performed in
planning the audit. The result of this analytical procedure identifies the existence of unusual
transactions or events, and amounts, ratios , and trends that might indicate the existence of fraud .
The third step in information gathering is to consider the fraud risk factors, which include the
incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, the opportunities to carry out the fraud , or
attitudes/rationalization to justify a fraudulent action . Lastly, there are many other sources of
information that may be helpful in identifying risk such as review of interim financial statement.
Step five. Risk Identification.

Auditors should identify risk that may result in material misstatements due to fraud. The
information gathered in the previous steps should be used to identify risks that might result in a
material misstatement due to fraud. Auditors should pay special attention if the risk factors ,
mainly pressure, opportunity and rationalization , exist. The identification of risks requires
professional judgment. In identifying risks, auditors should consider whether the risk involves
fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets, whether the risk could result in a
possible material misstatement of financial statements and the likelihood that it will result in
misstatement , and lastly, whether the potential risk is pervasive in the financial statements or
related to specific accounts. Auditors should consider improper revenue recognition as a fraud
risk, because many material misstatements due to fraudulent financial reporting result from over
or understatement of revenue. Management override of controls should also be considered a
fraud risk. A more complete list of risk factors is included in Appendix B, pages 22 to 25.
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Step six. Risk assessment.

Auditors should assess the identified risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity's
programs and controls that address the risks . According to SAS 55, auditors should understand
the five components of internal control in order to plan an audit. As part of the understanding of
the internal control, auditors should evaluate whether the programs and control are properly
designed and placed in operation.
Step seven. Responses to the results of the assessment.

Assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud should affect the aSSignment of
personnel and the extent of supervision and the extent of concern about the accounting principles
and policies adopted by management. The assessment of the risk should also be used to predict
the auditing procedures that could be used in conducting the audit. The nature of the auditing
procedures performed may need to be changed to obtain evidence that is more reliable or to
obtain additional corroborative information. The timing of substantive tests and the extent of the
procedures applied should also be modified to reflect the assessed risk of material misstatement
due to fraud . The extent of the procedures applied should reflect the assessment of the risk
(Please refer to appendix C for a list of examples of modification of the nature, timing and extent
of tests, and examples of responses to identified risk of misstatements ariSing from fraudulent
financial reporting and misappropriation of assets.)

Because management is in a unique position to perpetrate fraud, the auditor should examine
journal entries and other adjustments for eVidence, review accounting estimates for biases, and
evaluate the business rationale for Significant unusual transactions that could result in material
misstatement due to fraud (Please refer to appendix 0 for examples).
Step eight. Evidence evaluation.

First of all. auditors should assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud throughout the
audit. Examples of conditions that may be identified during fieldwork that change or support a
judgment regarding the assessment of the risks are given in AppendiX E. Secondly, the auditor
should evaluate whether analytical procedures performed as substantive tests or in the overall
review stage of the audit indicate a previously unrecognized risk of material misstatement due to
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fraud. Third, the auditor should evaluate the risks of material misstatement due to fraud at or near
the completion of fieldwork to see whether the accumulated results of auditing procedures and
other observations affect the assessment of the risks of material misstatement due to fraud made
earlier in the audit. If the matter involves higher-level management, the auditor should reevaluate
the assessed risk and its impact on the nature, timing and extent of the tests of balances or
transactions and the assessment of the effectiveness of controls. On the othef hand, if the auditor
believes the misstatement is or may be the result of fraud , but there is not enough evidence to
evaluate whether the effect is material, the auditor should attempt to obtain additional evidential
matter, consider the implications for other aspects of the audit, and discuss the matter with
appropriate level of management at least one level above those involved.
Step nine. Communication of possible fraud

Auditors should communicate a possible fraud to the appropriate level of management, even if
the matter is inconsequential. For fraud involving senior management which causes a material
misstatement in the financial statement, the auditors should report to the audit committee. If the
auditors identify some risk of material misstatement due to fraud that has continuing control
implications, the auditor should report to appropriate management. Generally, the auditor does
not have the responsibility to disclose possible ffaud to outside parties. However , the auditor may
do so if the matter relates to certain legal and regulatory requirements, in response to a subpoena
and to a funding agency or other specified agency.

Step ten. Documentation of auditor's consideration offraud.

The auditors should document the follOWing: the discussion among engagement personnel, the
procedures performed to obtain information necessary to identify and assess the risks of material
misstatement due to fraud , the identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud and a
description of the auditor's response to those risks, documentation that would support the
auditor's decision, the results of the procedures performed to further address the risk of
management override of controls, other conditions and analytical relationships that caused the
auditor to believe that additional auditing procedures or other responses were required, and the
nature of the communication about fraud made to management , the audit committee, and others.
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3. Case Analysis

In order for auditors to learn from the previous corporate fraud cases and to test how or if SAS
99 could have been effective in detecting these frauds, four recent fraud cases, including Enron
Cooperation, Tyco International, World Com, and ZZZZ Best Company, are documented in this
section. Each case analysis is composed of a brief summary of company background, followed
by analysis of how the fraud happened, why it happened, and finally and most importantly, how
SAS 99 could have been effective in detecting fraud .
3.1

Case one: Enron Corporation

What happened~Z

Enron was founded in 1985 from a merger between InterNorth, Inc. , and Houston Natural Gas
Company. As a former CEO of the Houston Natural Gas Company, Kenneth Lay emerged as
CEO of Enron. Lay followed his predecessor and adopted an aggressive growth strategy.
Kenneth Lay hired Jeffery Skilling in 1987, promoting him to CEO by early 2001 , while Lay
served as the chairman of the board of directors . During the 1990s, Skilling transformed Enron
from a natural gas supplier into an energy-trading firm that served as an intermediary between
energy producers and final consumers. Widely regarded as a successful transformation , Enron
reported that revenue grew from $}O billion in early 1990s to $101 billion in 2000. Kenneth Lay ,
Jeffrey Skilling and their top officers were nationally recognized because of Enron ' s new
business model. Enron was recognized as one of the most innovative, fastest growing and best
managed businesses and its stock price swelled.
Unfortunately, Enron suddenly collapsed and filed for bankruptcy in December 2001 3 . Enron 's
collapse shocked investors national-wide and the media reported that it was "the biggest crisis
investors have had since 1929." The loss of market capitalization was about 60 billion dollars

2
3

Michael C. Knapp. Contemporary Auditing Real Issues & Cases (Ohio: South-Westerns. 2004) 3-22.
"Eman Corporation". Wikipedia. 14 Nov. 2005 <online: http://en.wikipedia.arg/wik ilEnron >
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and thousands of Enron workers who held Enron' s stock in their 401 (k) retirement accounts lost
tens of billions of dollars.

Why did it happen?
There are numerous issues that are related to Enron's collapse, and the most important one is its
aggressive and fraudulent accounting practice, which was backed up by its top management
teams. Several major factors that contributed to Enron's collapse include: a bad corporate
culture, Enron's lack of internal control. Enron's transactions with its SPEs, its using of
derivatives to manipulate accounting results, and its intentional omission of important
information in financial statement disclosures . These accounting issues are discussed in detail
below.
One of the most important factors that contributed to Enron' s collapse was that Enron did not
have a corporate culture that encouraged honest accounting practice. Enron' s key executives,
such as Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Andre Fastow (former Enron CFO), were accused of
fostering rule breaking and discouraging problem reporting. Also, Enron' s internal control
system, a very important tool to decrease the risk of fraudulent financial reporting, broke down,
and lack of proper separation of duties allowed management to override control.

Special Purpose Entities, sometimes called special purpose vehicles, were used by Enron as a
tool to raise needed financing for variou s purposes without the debt being reported in its balance
sheet. An important gUideline, the so called 3 percent rule, provided by The Financial
Accounting Standard Board allows a company to not consolidate subsidiaries' financial
statements as long as at least 3 percent of a SpeCial Purpose Entity's capital is provided by
independent outside parties. Enron managed to establish hundreds of SPEs, and divert huge
amounts of its debt to these entities. Enron also conducted many transactions with its SPEs so
that it recognized unrealized gains on the increase in the market value of its own common stock.
Derivatives were another tool used by Enron to manipulate its accounting records . Enron entered
into long term commodity contracts to delivery energy commodities. Sometimes the period
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covered many years. According to the accounting rules, projected profits from those contracts
must be booked. However, Enron often inflated its profits by assuming a lower cost to provide
those commodities to fulfill the contracts.
Enron also violated generally accepted accounting principles in that it intentionally failed to
disclose information in the financial statement that was critical to Enron' s users. Stockholders,
employees, the SEC and other stakeholders of Enron were not totally aware of the true situation
of Enron.
Could SAS 99 have prevented the fraud?

Andersen had been Enron's auditor since the merger between InterNorth, Inc. and Houston
Natural Gas Company in 1985. As Enron's former auditor, Andersen was harshly criticized by
the public and was held responsible for Enron 's bankruptcy. As a result, Andersen's long and
proud history came to an end in 2001. In retrospect, people may ask that what could Andersen
have done differently, with the help of SAS 99 guidelines, to prevent the Enron fraud from
happening or to discover the fraud earlier?
Professional Skepticism: One of the mistakes Anderson had made was to assume that the

management team of Enron was honest and had integrity, and to believe everything management
said and the evidence that was presented to them. SAS 99 makes it very clear that it requires
auditors to exercise professional skepticism As I mentioned earlier, the management team of
Enron did not establish an honest corporate culture, and to some extent it even fostered the
dishonest accounting practices and discouraged problem reporting. If Andersen's auditors had
been a little more skeptical, the fraud at Enron could have been detected .
Risk identification: SAS 99 could have been helpful in the process of gathering information to

identify fraud risk factors. SAS 99 requires the auditor to make inquiries of management about
the possibility of fraud, to assess the effectiveness of internal controls, and to assume improper
revenue recognition as a fraud risk. A former employee of Enron , Sherron Watkins, vice
president of corporate development, wrote a letter to Kenneth Lay concerning the problematic
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accounting and possible scandals that were going on in Enron. However, no one from Andersen
had ever asked Enron's management about it. If the auditors had known this information, the
auditors would have discovered lots of fraud, such as related party transactions with Enron 's
hundreds of SPEs, improper gain recognition, overriding accounting principles, overstating
revenues and so on. Enron 's lack of internal control was also surprising. A top executive of
Dynegy, after briefly considering a merger with Enron, reported that Enron's lack of internal
control was mind-boggling. If Andersen's auditors had done what SAS 99 requires them to do,
such as talk to Enron 's internal audit personnel and Enron 's employees, they would have
gathered enough information to identify many significant risk factors which could have lead
them to uncover the fraud. Enron also had problems with improper revenue recognition . Enron
used the derivatives to manipulate its accounting records. It substantially understated the cost to
fulfill long-term contacts and thus overstated its revenue. If Enron' s auditors had assumed
improper revenue recognition as a risk factor, they wou ld have investigated more and assessed
the appropriateness of the assumptions Enron had made concerning the cost Enron would have in
order to fulfill contracts.

Responding to the identified risk Following the gUidelines of SAS 99 would have helped
Andersen's auditors to identify risks of fraud in Enron. In responding to the identified risk, the
SAS 99 procedures require auditors to adjust the nature, timing, and extent of procedures to be
performed and the assignment of personnel and supervision in order to obtain substantive audit
evidence. Because of the overwhelming risk of fraud that would have been identified, Andersen
would have assigned skilled auditors with Significant engagement experience, and they would
have been working under proper supervision. When there were considerable material
misstatements in Enron' s financial statement due to illegitimate transactions, Anderson's
accou ntants reported that they were comfortable about the transactions and how they were
presented in Enron's financial statements, even after they had spent considerable time analyzing
all sorts of questionable transactions. Also, more reliable information and evidence from outside
of Enron would have been obtained if SAS 99 were available at that time and Andersen 's
accountants followed it. That would have made Enron's scandal more obvious and it could have
been uncovered before it got worse.
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Communication of Fraud: It was determined that Anderson did not fulfill its professional
responsibility in that it failed to communicate to Enron's board of directors any reportable
conditions, such as , Enron's poor internal control, its dealing with SPEs, and its problematic
financial reporting. SAS 99 would have been effective in preventing and uncovering the fraud if
it had been followed , because it requires auditors to communicate about possible fraud to

management, the audit committee, and others.

The Importance of Independence: Overwhelming evidence suggested that Andersen was deeply
involved in Enron's fraud . Besides auditing, Andersen received millions of dollars for providing
consulting services to Enron. Accountants from Andersen helped Enron set up SPEs, and Enron
followed their advice. Based on available evidence, it is not unreasonable to suggest that
Andersen's accountants were aware of what was going on in Enron, and they knew that Enron 's
financial statements were not fairly presented according to generally accepted accounting
standards. Instead of issuing a qualified opinion and bringing it to the attention of the public,
Andersen tried to conceal the fraud, until the fraud grew too big and finally burst. From this we
can see that in order for SAS 99 to have been effective in preventing and detecting fraud in
Enron, Andersen would have had to be independent, and willing to follow the auditing standards.

In conclusion: Probably the most significant barriers to Enron's external auditors uncovering the
fraud in Enron was Anderson's deep involvement in Enron 's business decisions. As a result, in
order for SAS 99 to be effective in detecting the fraud, Anderson would have had to maintain its
independence and be willing to follow SAS gUidelines and uncover the fraud .
3.2

Case two: Tyco International

What happened!Z

Kozlowski and Swartz misappropriated company assets by which they enriched themselves at
the expense of the company, and they concealed their conduct from Tyco's board of directors.

The Securities and Exchange Commission. "Administrative Proceeding File No . 3-11212 " Nov . 14 . 2005 .
• http .llwww .sec.gov/litigation/adminl34-48328.htm>
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Kozlowski and Swartz used various methods to misappropriate company assets, such as the
relocation programs, the "Tyco Bonus" misappropriation , the Key employee loan program, and
the" ADT" automotive Bonus misappropriations. They took more than $120 million in bonuses,
which were never approved by the board of directors; they took interest-free loans (some were
.. forgiven" as part of Tyco ' s loan forgiveness program), and falsely presented the company's
financial condition to investors to boost the stock price while selling $575 million in stock
without telling investors. which is a requirement under SEC rules . Also, Kozlowski has been
charged with avoiding more than $1 million in sales taxes on the purchase of a painting.
supposedly shipped out of New York State. In January 2005, Kozlowski and Swartz were found
guilty of grand larceny. securities fraud . conspiracy, and falsifying business records, and they
face 15 to 30 years in prison.
Why did it happen?

Unlike Enron's Key Lay, Kozlowski and Swartz were not charged with accounting fraud. The
Kozlowski and Swartz case was about their misappropriation of Tyco' s assets-money. In
essence, the Tyco case is all about Kozlowski and Swartz's greed. They used the company's
money to support their lavish lifestyle. For example, Dennis Kozlowski used company money to
pay for an $18 million New York co-op apartment and a $14 million private art collection as
well as other lavish items such as a custom-made $6000 shower curtain, $ 2000 trash can, and a
$2,000,000 birthday party for his wife in Italy.
Could SAS 99 have prevented the fraud?

Professional skepticism:

Richard P. Scalzo was the PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC)

engagement partner for the audits of the financial statements of Tyco international Ltd . for the
period from 1997 through 2001. In the process of auditing the company's financial statements,
Scalzo became aware of the lack of integrity of Tyco's management team , such as the use of
relocation programs to misappropriate company assets . According to SAS99, Scalzo should
have directed his audit team to reevaluate the risk assessment of the Tyco audits and perform
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further testing and audit procedures to address the risk factor. If Scalzo had done that, the Tyco
fraud could have been discovered at its earliest stage.

Obtaining the information needed to identify the risk factors: SAS 99 could have been effective
to prevent the Tyco fraud if the auditors had followed the SAS 99 guidelines. SAS 99 requires
auditors to obtain information needed to identify risk factors, and it also lists examples of fraud
risk factors related to misappropriation of assets. Among these, at least three risk fa ctors are
present in this case. The most important one is the changes in behavior or lifestyle of Kozlowski
and Swartz. Kozlowski spent $2 million to have a birthday party for his wife, and his shower
curtain was worth as much as $6000. And these are only small items that he spent the company's
money on. SAS 99 could have been useful in helping auditors to identify this risk factor in that
it requires auditors to make inquiry of management and others within the entity about the risk of
fraud. If the auditors followed the SAS 99 guidelines, Kozlowski's lavish lifestyle, especially the
$2 million dollar birthday party, would have been discovered by auditors.

The other risk factor is the inadequate system of authorizing and approving of transactions. The
size and amount of misappropriation in this Tyco case was huge and it is surprising how the
fraud was carried on without the proper knowledge and authorization of the board of directors.
The disputes between Tyco' s management team and its external auditor concerning the proper
disclosure of information, for example, Tyco's refusal to disclose non-interest-bearing
"relocation loans," is also a risk factor that auditors would consider if they followed the SAS 99
guidelines. Because, according to SAS 99, auditors should always consider disputes with
management a risk factor.

Assessing the identified risk and responding to the results of assessment: If the auditors had
followed the SAS 99 guidelines , they would have identified a Significant risk of misstatement in
the financial statement due to fraud . In responding to the results of the risk assessment , SAS 99
requires auditors to evaluate the business rationale for Significant unusual transactions. There
were many unusual transactions , such as the forgiven relocation loan and huge number of key
employee award and bonuses , which would have led to the conclusion that fraudulent activities
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existed. Various red flags encountered by the auditors in the audit process also would have
directed the auditors to discover the fraud. For example, the clear evidence showed that the Key
Employee Loan Program , whose stated purpose was the payment of taxes on the vesting of
restricted stock, was being used for the improper benefit of its most senior officers.

In conclusion: SAS 99 could have been effective in preventing or uncovering the Tyco fraud.
However, in order for SAS 99 to work , the most important part is for auditors to follow the
gUidelines. There were many risk factors in this case which could have suggested , and brought to
the attention of its board of directors as well as external auditors, the presence of
misappropriation of company assets by senior management.
3.3

Case three: World Com

What happened?Z

WorldCom, once the telecommunication giant, filed for bankruptcy protection on July 21 , 2002.
During the period of 1999 to 2000, WorldCom manipulated its financial statements and
overstated its income by approximately $9 billion. About 20,000 people lost their jobs and
investors lost about $180 billion in WoridCom 's bankruptcy. Criminal charges were filed against
its former CEO Bernard Ebbers, former CFO Scott Sullivan as well as five other former officers.
In March 2005 , Bernard Ebbers, former CEO, was found guilty of conspiracy, securities fraud
and false regulatory filings. Scott Sullivan also pleaded guilty to accounting fraud charges.
Why did it happen?

In 1999, WorldCom's revenue growth halted and its stock price dropped. At that time, Bernard
Ebbers owned $1 billion worth of World Com 's stock. In order to prevent his share of WorldCom
stock from depreciating and to meet the expectations of financial analysts' projected earnings,

5 WashingPost.com. "Corporate Scandal Primer: WorldCom" Nov 15.2005 <http://www.washingtonposl.com/wp
srvfbusiness/scandals/primerlindex.html>
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WorldCom's senior management team "cooked the books" in order for the company to look
better, as evidenced by the inflated company stock prices.

Could SAS 99 have prevented the fraud?

WorldCom manipulated its financial results in two ways. First, WorldCom categorized operating
expenses as capital expenditures. Second, World Com reduced its operating expenses by
improperly releasing certain reserves held against operating expenses. According to AICP A,
from 1998 to 2000, WorldCom reduced reserve accounts held to cover liabilities of acquired
companies, which increased WorldCom's revenues by $2.8 billion. By marking operating costs
as long-term investments, World Com increased its revenue by $3.85 billion. SAS 99 could have
been helpful in discovering the fraud in the following ways:

Obtaining the information needed to identify the fraud risks: SAS 99 states that the auditor
should use professional judgment in determine whether a risk factor is present and this should be
considered in identifying and assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud. At least
three risk factors listed in SAS 99 would have helped auditors discover the possibility of fraud in
WorldCom. The first risk factor was that World Com 's management faced great pressure as the
revenue growth for World Com halted and its stock price dropped in 1999. As a result, there
existed excessive pressure for WorldCom's management to meet the expectations of investment
analysts, institutional investors and so on. The second risk factor was that management, such as
Bernard Ebbers and Scott Sullivan, had significant financial interest in WorldCom as they each
owned billions of dollars worth of World Com 's stock. Declining company stock price meant
declining of their wealth. The third risk factor was that WorldCom had unusual profitability
when compared to that of other companies in the same industry, such as AT& T. All of these risk
factors listed in SAS 99could have been helpful and provided some hints to WorldCom's
auditors to help them discover the fraud.

Identify the risk that may result in a material misstatement due to frau: Both improper revenue
recognition and management override control existed in WoridCom's fraud. SAS 99 could have
been helpful in discovering the fraud in that it requires auditors to assume improper revenue
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recognition and management override control as fraud risks and requires auditors to take
appropriate actions to address the risk.

Responding to the risk assessment: According to SAS 99, auditors should respond to the risk
assessment by reviewing the revenue recognition and management estimates. This could have
helped auditors to catch WoridCom's treating of operating expenses as capital expenditures as
well as its manipulating the estimation of reserve accounts in order to artificially inflate its
operating income.

Evaluating audit evidence: SAS 99 lists some examples of evidence that suggested the existence
of fraudulent accounting transactions in WoridCom. For example, many artificial transactions
and journal entries that significantly overstated WorldCom 's income were unexplained and
without proper support documentation; and some unusual or unexplained analytical relationships
existed, such as WoridCom 's unusual profit compared to the industry trends.

Conclusion: SAS 99 could have been effective in preventing the fraud in WorldCom if the SAS
99 procedures had been carefully followed by auditors.

:S.4

Case four:

ZZZZ Best Company

What happened§.Z

ZZZZ Best was established in 1981 by Barry Mir.kow. a fifteen year old high school graduate.

Started as a carpet-cleaning business, ZZZZ Best expanded into the insurance restoration
business, which accounted for 80% of the company 's reported income, as Minkow was not
patient with the growth of the company. Based on the company 's high growth and high reported
income in 1987, the company's stock became one of the hottest stocks on Wall Street. The
company had a market valuation of $211 million after only six year in business. Unfortunately,

6

Michael C. Knapp , Contemporary Auditing, Real Issues & Cases (Ohio South-Westerns, 2004) \20-\32.
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the company was nothing more than a massive fraud scheme that fooled banks, investors, and
CPA firms. ZZZZ Best never made a profit, and its growth and its reported income were totally
fictitious. ZZZZ Best declared bankruptcy in 1988 as it become apparent to the public that the
company was having difficulty paying off its debts.

Why did it happen?
Several factors resulted in the fraud. First, Minkow faced the problem of a shortage of working
capital when he started out as a carpet cleaner. Banks refused to lend him money, and he felt the
financial pressure. Second, Minkow deceived law firms, CPA firms, and (Ill other related entities
by forging documents and spending millions of dollars to rent construction sites to deceive
auditors' onsite inspections, trying to make auditors think that the sites really belonged to ZZZZ
Best Company. Third, ZZZZ Best company's auditors did not exercise due professional care in
conducting the audit. For example, many fraud risk factors were overlooked and auditors
obtained too few direct confirmations from independent sources to support ZZZZ Best
Company's financial statements.

Could SAS 99 have prevented the fraud?

Obtaining the information needed 10 identify risk of fraud: SAS 99 could helve been helpful in

detecting the fraud in that it requires auditors to consider fraud riSK factors. There were many
fraud risk factors that. if ZZZ Best's auditors had looked carefully, would have led the auditors
to uncover the fraud early: for example, ZZZZ Best's rapid growth or unusual profitability,
espeCially compared to that of other companies in the same industry. its unreasonable demands
on its auditors to sign an agreement not to "make any follow up telephone calls to any contractor,
insurance companies, the building owners, or the other individuals involved in the restoration
ccmtract," the domination of management by Minkow alone without compensating controls, and
the fact that Minkow had been involved in a string of credit card forgeries as a teenager.
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Responding the assessed risk: SAS 99 could have been effective in helping to detect the fraud

in that it requires auditors to change the nature, timing and extent of the auditing procedures to
reflect the extent of assessed risk .

Due to the high risk of material misstatement due to fraud, which could have been identified if
SAS 99 guidelines were followed, the auditors should have changed the nature of the auditing
procedures to be performed to obtain more reliable or additional corroborative information. For
example, instead of making inquiries of management, more evidential matter should have been
obtained from ZZZZ Best's vendors, customers and creditors, which could have easily led to the
discover of the fraud.
More substantial auditing procedures could have been performed to discover the fraud . More
specifically, according the SAS 99, ZZZZ Best's auditors should have done the following in
order to uncover the fraud. First, its auditors should have inspected ZZZZ Best's restoration sites
on a surprise or unannounced basis. Secondly, auditors should have made oral and face to face
inquiries of ZZZZ Best's major customers and suppliers in addition to written confirmation. And
thirdly, auditors should have made inquires of management or others within the ZZZZ Best
Company about the risks of fraud.

Evaluating the audit evidence: The following conditions that should have been identified in the

fieldwork would have supported a judgment that fraud had occurred in ZZZZ Best Company:
unsupported transactions, anonymous tips to the auditor about alleged fraud, and missing
documents and unavailability of original documents. In addition, in his book Contemporary

AudjUng. Real Issues & Case, Michael C. Knapp lists some unusual or unexplained analytical
relationships that suggest the existence of fraud, which ZZZZ Best's auditors had overlooked:
1. The amounts called for by the insurance restoration contracts were unrealistically large.
2. The number of multimillion-dollar insurance restoration contracts reportedly obtained by
ZZZZ Best exceeded the total number available national wide during the relevant time
period.
3. The purported contracts failed to identify the insured partied, the insurance companies, or the
locations of the jobs.
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4. The contracts consisted of a single page that failed to contain details and specifications of the
work to be done, such as the square yardage of carpet to be replaced, which were usuaJ and
customary in restoration business.
5. Virtually all of the insurance restoration contracts were with the same party
6. A large portion of the ZZZZ Best insurance restoration contract occurred immediately, and
opportunistically, prior to a planned offering of stock
7. The purported contracts provided for payments to ZZZZ Best or Minkow alone rather than to
the insured or jointly with ZZZZ Best and the insured, contrary to the practice of the
industry.
8. The purported contracts provided for payments by the insurance adjustor contrary to normal
practice in the industry under which payments are customarily made by the insurance
company directly to its insured or jointly to its insured and the restorer.
9. ZZZZ Best's purported gross profit margins for its restoration business were greatly in
excess of the normal profit margins for the restoration industry
10. The internal controls at ZZZZ Best were grossly inadequate.

Conclusion: Compared to the first three corporate frauds, the ZZZZ Best Company fraud was

simple and relatively easy to detect. It could have been detected by auditors if they had followed
the SAS 99 procedures and only tried to conduct a face to face interview with the company 's
customers, vendors as well as its creditors.

4. Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, I documented SAS 99 procedures and four recent corporate frauds , and analyzed
how or if SAS 99 could have been effective in detecting these frauds. Because the detailed audit
documentation for each of these fraud cases was not available, I was not able to identify the
details of the audit procedures that were or were not done by these companies' external auditors .
However, after careful analysis based on available information, I concluded that SAS 99 ,
combined with other Statement of Auditing Standards issued by the Auditing Standard Board,
could have been reasonably effective in detecting frauds , if followed by auditors who diligently
exercise their due professional care.
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As mentioned before. although SAS 99 is a set of effective standards intended to provide
guidelines for external auditors to uncover fraud. it can also effectively help corporate
management. internal auditors. as well as corporate employees to identify risk factors and
implement effective internal controls to prevent fraud from happening in the first place. Take
Tyco International as an example. If the board of directors was aware of the risk factors. such as
the lavish life styles of its key employees. which could have indicated the possibilities of
misappropriation of company assets, appropriate actions could have been taken to address the
issue before the fraud got worse. So, in the future, it could be useful to identify or discuss how
SAS 99 can be used by corporations or companies in preventing frauds, not just detecting frauds.
After all, if fraud can be prevented before it happens, it is beneficial to both companies and our
society.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Changes in SAS 99 from SAS 82 1

•

A dramatically increased emphasis on maintaining an attitude of professional skepticism.

•

Increased discussion among engagement personal regarding fraud in the financial
statements.

•

Emphasis on obtaining more information regarding fraud risks.

•

Increased inquiry and interaction with client's personnel on all levels and in all areas.

•

Increased emphasis on designing audit procedures to identity fraud risks.

•

continuing attention to fraud risk factors and indicator throughout the audit

•

Expanded assessment and increased documentation.

Donald C Marczewski and Michael D. Akers .. CPA 's Perceptions of the Impact of SAS 99." The CPA Tournai
Online. June, (2005) . 18, Nov. 2005 <http/lwwwnvsscpaorg/cpajournaV200S/60S/essentials/p38.hIm>

7
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Appendix B: Risk factors 8

Risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting:

Pressures

A. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as:
•

High degree of competition or market saturation, declining margins

•

High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product
obsolescence, or interest rates.

•

Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or overall economy

•

Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover
imminent

•

Recurring negative cash flows from operations while reporting earning and earnings
growth

•

Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in
the same industry.

•

New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.

B. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of
third parties due to the follOWing:
•

Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional investors,
significant creditors, or other external parities

•

Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive.

•

Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayments or olher
debt covenant requirements

8

AICPA . December, 2005. "' Appendix to SAS No. 99, Fraud Risk Factors. " December 2, 2005.

<http llwwwaicpa.org/anlifraud/riskl38 .hlm>

22

Appendix B

•

Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant
pending transactions.

C. Management or the board of director's personal finan cial situation is threatened by the
entity's financial performance arising from the following:
•

significant finanCial interests in the entity

•

significant portions of their compensation is related to the company's
performance

•

personal guarantees of debts of the entity

•

Pressure to meet financial targets set up by the management or board of directors.
Opportunities

Opportunities to engage in fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:

A.

Significant relatp-d-party transaction not in the ordinary course of business or with related entities
not audited or audited by another firm
•

Ability or power to dominate a certain industry that allow the company to involve
in transactions that are not at arm's length

•

transaction that involve subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to
corroborate

•

Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions

•

cross international board transactions

•

operations in tax-haven without clear business justification

B. Ineffective monitoring
•

A single person dominates management

•

Ineffective board of directors

C. Complex or unstable organizational structure
• Difficult to identify the entities that have controlling interest in the entity
• Organizational structure involving unusual legal entity
• High turn over of senior management
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D. Deficient internal control
•

Inadequate monitoring of controls

•

High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting or internal audit
staff

•

Ineffective accounting and information system
Rationalizations

Conditions that allow fraud perpetrators to rationalize their fraudulent activities:
•

Ineffective communication, implementation, or enforcement of ethical standards

•

Non-financial management excessively participate in selection of accounting
principles or determine of significant estimates

•

Known history of violations of security l(lw and regulations

•

Management has excessive interest in stock price and earnings

•

Aggressive or unrealistic forecasts

•

Management failing to correct known reportable condition

•

An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize
reported earning for tax-motivated reasons.

•

Management attempts to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting

•

Frequent disputes with current or predecessor auditor

•

Unreasonable demands on the auditor

•

Limit auditor 's access to information or communication to audit committee.

•

Management attempts to influence the scope of the auditor's work.

Risk factors relating to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
Pressures

A. Personal financial obligations
B. Adverse relationships between the entity and employees
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•

Known or anticipated future layoffs

•

Anticipated changes to compensation or benefit plan

•

Rewards inconsistent with expectations
Opportunities

•

Large amount of cash on hand or processed

•

Small size, high value inventory items

•

Easily convertible assets

•

Fixed assets lacking identification of ownership

C. Inadequate internal control over assets

•

Inadequate segregation of duties

•

Inadequate management oversight

•

Inadequate job applicant screening

•

Inadequate record keeping

•

Inadequate authorization

•

Inadequate physical safeguard of assets

•

Lack of reconciliations of assets

•

Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions

•

Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key control factions

•

Inadequate management understanding of information technology

•

Inadequate access control over records
Attitudes/rationalization

Conditions that allow fraud perpetrators to rationalize their fraudulent activities of
misappropriation of assets:
•

Disregard for need for monitoring

•

Disregard for internal control

•

Behavior indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction with the company

•

Change of lifestyle that many indicate assets have been misappropriated.
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Appendix C: Modification of Nature, Timing and Extent of Audit Test

9

A. Example of modification of nature, timing, and extent of test in response to identified risks of
material misstatements due to fraud
•

Performing procedures at location on a surprise

•

Requesting that inventories be counted at the end of the reporting period

•

Making oral inquiries of major customers and suppliers in addition to written
confirmation

•

Performing substantive analytical procedures using disaggregated data

•

Interviewing personnel involved in activities in areas where a risk has been identified

•

Discussing with other independent auditors, if any , concerning the extent of work that
needs to be performed

B. Examples of Reponses to identified risks of misstatement arising from fraudulent financi al
reporting:
a. Revenue recognition
•

Performing substantive analytical

procedures relating to

revenue

using

disaggregated date
•

Confirming with customers certain relevant contract terms and the absence of side
agreements

•

Inquiring of the entity's ales and marketing personnel or in-house legal counsel
regarding sales or shipments near the year end.

•

Inventory qualities

b. Examining inventory records
•

Count inventory at or near the end of reporting period

•

Perform additional procedures during the observation of the count

l! AICPA . Statement of Auditing Sta ndard s No . 99 : consid eration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.

New

York: AICPA Inc. 2003.

26

Appendix C

•

Using a specialist

•

Test the reasonableness of the qualities

•

Using computer -assisted audit techniques to further test the compilation of the
inventory counts

•

Management estimates

c. Supplement the audit evidence
•

Engage a specialist

•

Develop an independent estimate for comparisons

•

A retrospective review of similar management judgments and assumptions in
prior periods.

C. Example of response to identifies risk or misstatement ariSing from misappropriations of

assets.
..

Obtaining an understanding of the control

•

Testing the effectiveness of such control

•

Physical inspection of assets

(9

Use of substantive analytical procedures
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Appendix D: Responses to risk of management override of controls lO

A. Examining Journal entries and other adjustments
•

Obtain an understanding of the entities financial reportillg

•

Identify and select journal entries and other adjustments for testing

•

Determine the timing of the test

•

Inquire of individuals involved in the financial reporting process

B. Reviewing accounting estimates for biases
•

Whether the estimates are reasonable

•

Review and compare the estimate with the prior year

C Evaluating the business rationale for significant unusual transactions

•

Whether the transaction is overly complex

•

Whether there are discussions about the nature of such transaction with audit
committee

•

Whether management is emphasis

011

the need for particular accounting treatment

than other

10

•

Whether transactions involve unconsolidated related parities, especially SPEs.

•

Whether transactions involve previously unidentified related parties

AICPA . Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99: consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. New

York : AICPA Inc. 2003.

28

Appendix E 11: Evaluating Audit Evidence

Examples of condition may be identified during fieldwork that changes or support a judgment
regarding the assessment of the risks:

A. Discrepancies in the accounting records
•

Transactions are not recorded in a complete or timely manner

•

Unsupported or unauthorized balances or transactions

•

Last-minute adjustments

•

Evidence of employee's access to systems and record inconsistent with their duties

•

Tips or complaints to the auditor about the alleged fraud

B. Conflicting or missing evidential matter including:
•

Missing document

•

Documents that have been altered

•

Unavailability of original documents

•

Significant unexplained items on reconciliations

•

Inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses from management or employees

"

Unusual discrepancies between the entities' records confirmation replies

•

Missing inventory or physical assets

•

Unavailable or missing electronic evidence

•

Inability to produce evidence of key systems development and program change

C. Problematic or unusual relationship between the auditor and the management

II

•

Denial of access to records facilities, certain employees, customers, vendors, or others

•

Undue time pressures imposed by management

•

Complaints by management

AICPA . Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99: consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit New

York AICPA Inc. 2003.
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•

Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information

•

Unwillingness to facilitate auditor access to key electronic files for testing

•

Unusual delays in providing requested information

•

Denial of access to key ;IT operations

•

Unwillingness to add or revise disclosures in the financial statements
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